Generally speaking, CCPs become effective when the average market price for the covered commodity falls below the target national price. A shortcoming of the CCP is that it only addresses price risk and is not based on the crops or acres actually being grown by the farmer each year. The ACRE program is designed to address these problems by keying the payments off the benchmark state yield multiplied by the ACRE guarantee price for a specific commodity.
The payoff of ACRE program depends on realizations of state-level revenues and thus may be related to the payoffs of other risk management instruments available to farmers, such as crop revenue coverage (CRC) and to a lesser extent the actual production history (APH) insurance contracts. Since the decision to switch to ACRE is irreversible, understanding the full effect of ACRE on producer's risk exposure is an important factor in making the decision. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section discusses related literature and presents a formal decision model of a representative farmer followed by a section outlining stochastic simulation methodology and data. The results are presented and discussed next. The last section concludes.
Analytical Model
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The model used for the present analysis is similar to that of Vedenov and Power. In particular, we consider a representative farmer who grows a single crop (cotton in Texas or corn in Illinois), receives payments from any government programs she is eligible for, and may purchase either a yield or a revenue insurance contract. The analysis includes the direct, counter-cyclical, and loan-deficiency payments (DP, CCP, and LDP, respectively) as well as yield and revenue insurance contracts (APH and CRC). The brief descriptions of the programs and their payoffs are summarized in Appendix A.
Average Crop Revenue Election
The ACRE program is triggered by the state-level revenue dropping below a guaranteed level which is defined as a product of the benchmark yield and an ACRE guarantee price. (Zulauf, Vitale and Dicks, 2008) . In addition, the payoff of the direct payment in Appendix A needs to be multiplied by 0.8, while the payoff of the LDP is replaced by .
Scenario Comparison
In order to evaluate the effect of ACRE on effectiveness of crop insurance contracts we where, W0 is an initial wealth, a is planted acreage, Premium is per-acre insurance premium for a corresponding insurance contract with selected coverage level, and the payments are expanded in Appendix A.
Measuring Risk-Reducing Effectiveness
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The four scenarios were compared using the expected utility framework. In particular, the representative farmer was assumed to prefer an alternative that maximized the CRRA power utility function . In particular, the expected utility optimization was used to determine the optimal coverage level for each insurance product under the provisions of both Farm Bills.
Data and Simulation Methodology
Following Vedenov and Power, we used the Monte-Carlo simulations combined with the copula approach to simulate the distributions of the net wealth and corresponding expected utilities. The approach is briefly outlined below. A more complete overview of copulas and specific details of simulation methodology can be found in Cherubini, Luciano and Vecchiato; Nelsen; and Vedenov and Power.
For the purposes of the analysis, historical yield data at national, state, county and farm level were used along with data on cash, marketing year average (MYA), and futures prices for cotton and corn. Given the shortness of farm-level data, the primary joint distribution modeled was that of futures prices and county-level data. Frank copula was used to model the dependence structure. The choice of this particular copula is justified by the desire to have clearly defined tail dependence typically observed between yields and prices. The functional form of the Frank copula is where is a parameter that can be estimated from data (Nelsen, 2006) .
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The copula was combined with kernel density estimate of the marginal distribution of state-level yields and log-normal marginal distribution of harvest-time futures prices and used to generate Monte-Carlo draws of the pairs ( . As in Vedenov and Power, the local cash prices, p, and the marketing year average prices, were modeled as linear functions of the harvest-time futures prices f1. The latter were also used as proxy for the CRC harvest price, . In particular, we estimated
The realizations of the county and farm-level yields were then generated from the realizations of the state-level yields using the Frank copula and kernel-density estimates of the corresponding marginal distributions.
Model Parameters
To implement the analysis, data were collected for a number of price and yield variables.
Data for cash and market year average prices were collected from NASS for the time period To compare the risk-reducing effectiveness of APH and CRC insurance combined with government payments under ACRE and under the previous 2002 Farm Bill (DP, LDP, CCP) , we considered three regions, namely: irrigated and non-irrigated cotton production in Texas and corn production in Illinois. Irrigated cotton production is expected to stabilize yields, which are then less correlated with national prices than in the case of no irrigation.
Illinois is the largest corn-growing state in the country. Yields in Illinois tend to be highly correlated with national prices.
We considered representative farms located in Hockley County, Texas, for irrigated cotton and Hale County, Texas, for non-irrigated cotton, and Piatt County, Illinois, for corn. These counties were selected because they are representative for their states. Each farm was assumed to consist of 100 acres, all of which were treated as base acres for the purposes of government payments. Initial wealth (W0) was set to $50,000 for all three regions. Table 4 . To simplify, we used the 1998-2001 averages to set the DP and CCP yields. Details on the ACRE programs were obtained from Zulauf and applied to the base year. We set APH price election to 100%. The RMA premium calculator was used to determine the actual APH and CRC premiums across levels of coverage and for specific counties in 2006.
The reference risky payoff x was defined as net wealth free of government support.
We considered risk premiums of 0%, i.e., risk neutrality, 5% and 10%. Table 1 summarizes   10 information about the coefficient of risk aversion γ that corresponds to each risk premium level. The coefficient of risk aversion, for a given risk premium, is highest for Hockley County, TX, where cotton production is irrigated. It is 9.45 for a 5% risk premium and 33.24 for a 10% risk premium. Risk aversion is lower for Piatt County, IL, and lowest for Hale County, TX.
Results
This section discusses results obtained for the certainty-equivalent wealth based on various levels of coverage. For the parameters of both the 2002 Farm Bill and the ACRE program, we consider APH and CRC contracts together with government payments. The results, presented in table 5, show that to achieve the greatest possible reduction in risk, the highest available coverage level should be selected. Indeed, the expected utility of wealth for a producer is for the most part increasing in the level of coverage. Note that the producer, assuming risk-neutrality, nonetheless selects more coverage than the minimum level, particularly in Hockley County, TX, and in Piatt County, IL. This is because the insurance premiums are not actuarially fair. Figures 1, 2 and 3 show, for Hale and Hockley County, TX, and Piatt County, IL, respectively, the certainty-equivalent wealth across insurance contract coverage levels for the case of a 10% risk premium. producer, CRC insurance appears to be a more efficient instrument to manage risk than APH insurance in all counties studied. One explanation for this finding is that the CRC base price is allowed to increase during the period between planting and harvest, while APH contract prices, established by the FCIC, are fixed during this period.
Conclusion
The purpose of this paper is to compare the impact on the effectiveness of crop insurance The following provides a brief overview of the government payments and insurance contracts used in the paper. More details and most up-to-date information can be found on the websites of Farm Service Agency (www.fsa.usda.gov) and Risk Management Agency (www.rma.usda.gov) of USDA.
Direct Payments (DP)
Direct payment is a fixed amount paid to the farmers according to the formula where is the direct payment rate, is the base yield, and is base acres.
Loan Deficiency Payments (LDP)
LDP is equivalent to a marketing assistance loan and is essentially a free put option on crop price. The payment is calculated as , where a is planted acreage, is realized yield, P is the commodity price, and is the marketing loan rate.
Counter-Cyclical Payments (CCP)
CCPs were authorized by the 2002 Farm Bill and provide income support whenever the market price falls below a predetermined target price adjusted for direct payment rate.
Formally, , 13 where is the CCP base yield, is the CCP target price, is the marketing year average price, and the remaining variables are as defined above.
Actual Production History Insurance (APH)
APH is a basic yield protection insurance that pays off whenever the realized yield drops below a selected coverage level. Formally, , where is the realized farm-level yield, is the coverage level expressed as percent of the historical average yield , a is the planted acreage, and is the APH price.
Crop Revenue Coverage (CRC)
CRC guarantees a certain level of revenue defined as a portion of the product of the APH yield and a pre-set price so that , where is the coverage level, p is the realized price, is the CRC price, is the harvest time price, and the rest of the variables are the same as in APH.
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